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History of Emigration from Hungary 
Castles (2015) states that migration is a collective action arising out of social, economic, 
and political change affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas. These 
reasons often overlap making it difficult to separate economic from social, cultural, and political 
reasons. Since the end of WWII Europe has become a migration destination. This was caused by 
decolonization, rapid economic growth, and the EU becoming a free trade and migration zone 
particularly in Western Europe. Emigration of highly skilled people is a problem more or less 
across the EU, it is worth noting that there is an important difference in Hungary. Western 
Europe is challenged by the threat of their professionals moving to the USA as the latter offers 
an almost unmatched mix of money, research personnel concentration, and meritocracy. 
However, if we look at Eastern Europe and in this case Hungary, apparently not only the USA 
seems to have this kind of pulling attractiveness but also some Western European countries, 
predominately the Benelux states, UK, and Germany.  
Személyi (2011) states that, traditionally, emigration waves occur during or immediately 
after large crises or changes in the society of the origin country. There is only one exception in 
the case of Hungary: the transformation of the political system in 1989. The early to mid-1990s 
saw a new labor frontier for Western Europe with the newly former USSR satellites, including 
Hungary.  However, emigration actually decreased throughout the 1990s. This can at least 
partly be attributed to the euphoria of the people anticipating the hopefully upcoming freedom 
and social wealth. However, emigration rose for skilled people due to later changes in laws. The 
significant outflows from Eastern Europe heading west during this time were largely of ethnic 
minorities to homelands or safer areas. For Hungary, this was the minority Roma population 
moving West. However, Hungary was also considered one of the more stable former Warsaw 
Pact countries and it received many migrants hoping to use Hungary as a transit country as well, 
due to its border with Austria. Since Hungary itself was still forming a new government at this 
time, they were unprepared for immigration as they had no offices or laws addressing the 
subject. According to Düvell (2014) in 1994 there were up to 2 million migrants in Central 
Europe, mostly in Hungary, wanting to move west. A lot of attention was paid to migrants 
wanting to use Hungary as a transit country at the time for both regular and irregular migration 
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since these migrants stood out ethnically since in addition to Balkan migrants Hungary received 
many Afghan migrants looking to move west. This triggered biased investigations into transit 
migration at the time. Many of these migrants are thought to have been set on moving on from 
Hungary due to Hungary’s homogenous cultural and difficult language as well as increasing anti-
immigration policies and views. Specific numbers within Hungary are unknown; however, 
emigration of both citizens and refugees is still thought to be higher than immigration 
throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. 
Galgóczi (2013) notes that the early 2000s saw another boom in migration out of 
Hungary to Western Europe. Short-term migration, long-term foreign employment, and 
emigration potential all rose significantly from the early to mid-2000s. With Hungary joining the 
EU in 2004, emigration increased significantly and reached an unprecedented high in 2005 
despite restrictions from Western EU countries which expired completely in 2011. After a drop 
in emigration in 2006, this rate along with long-term foreign employment, remained constant 
near early 2000s levels until 2008. However, short-term migration had decreased. Any 
underlying long-term trend will be upset by unique discrete events or shocks. For example, the 
worldwide global economic crisis (2007-2010) in the words of the OECD (2012). Hungary 
experienced a strong spike in emigration in 2008 likely due to the shock of the global economic 
crisis. Since 2010 (end of the global economic crisis), the emigration of the highly skilled has 
increased considerably once again and the number of those intending to emigrate permanently 
and those emigrating permanently is at an all-time high and increasing year after year. This 
coincides with the Fidesz party coming to power and staying there ever since. A lot of increase 
in emigration and emigration intentions is not considered to be due to economic reasons 
despite Hungary’s worsening economic position but rather political reasons. 2015 hit a new all-
time high in terms of both total emigration and educated emigration of Hungarian citizens as 
well as immigration and emigration of refugees. Hungary occupies a unique position with 
respect to refugees in the sense that it was heavily involved in the 2015 refugee crisis, yet the 
country became a frontline country without any immigrants. Juhász (2017) notes that in 2015, 
391,384 irregular migrants and 177,135 legal asylum seekers entered Hungary. This was up 
314% from previous year, but most were seeking to head west. Asylum-seekers submitted 
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applications in Hungary only for formal reasons and, almost without exception, they all moved 
on to Western Europe afterwards, Germany being their primary destination. By the end of 
2015, only between 900 and 1,000 refugees stayed in Hungary. Half of them were in detention 
centers and were unable to leave, and most of the other half had already started immigration 
procedures. Many left due to financial reasons and the homogenous culture of Hungary. 
Since the fall of communism in Hungary, the reasons for educated emigration have 
largely remained the same. According to Személyi (2011) a 2005 study, that was reproduced in 
2008, on the demographics of Hungarian emigrants, one quarter of survey respondents had 
degrees in at least two science fields, 10% had educational qualification higher than PhD, and 
4% were members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. These emigrants said they left due to 
the limited job market in Hungary for professionals in the natural and technical sciences, 
especially in R&D. As to the overall motivation structure of emigrants, the results in 2008 were 
the same as in 2005: the main push factor is income, but professional development/career 
opportunities, and the overall political situation in Hungary are also significant. At the 
destination countries they usually find what they felt they needed: satisfaction in current job is 
higher in every respect than it was in Hungary. Additionally, in 2008 75% of emigrants said they 
settled for the long term, which was up from 60% in 2005. 
 
According to Szilasi & Halász (2018) a 2013 study found that in the case of Hungarians, 
predominantly economic and political, and to a lesser extent socio-cultural and geographic-
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historical factors explain the strengthening of emigration. Due to current demographic erosion, 
decline in the number of births, social, educational and health care deficiencies, the future 
consolidation of the pension system, the growing proportion of deprived social groups, exodus 
of rural population and more, the current and the future situation will likely become worse due 
to the fact as the most affected age groups are getting younger. The average age of emigrants is 
29/30 years old. According to data from Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (KSH), The Hungarian 
Central Statistical Office, 44% of migrants are under 30 years old and 77% are under 40. KSH 
also noted in 2013 that Hungarian students attending Hungarian universities and colleges 
decreased by 25% during the last decade. These students acquire their first work experience in 
host countries, continuing their socialization in an inclusive and multicultural social 
environment, establish long lasting social networks, advance their foreign language and 
interpersonal competences and all these attributes reinforce their migration potential even for 
a lifetime. Growing dissatisfaction with education policy and the social welfare system as well 
as uncertainty about the future are all motivational sources that intensify migration. 
Additionally, the macroeconomic situation of the country, the stagnant GDP since 2010, the 
increasing inter- and intra-regional inequalities caused by maldistribution of the social systems, 
the low level of average wages on the individual level, the enormous levels of debts burdening 
predominantly low and medium social strata groups, and the lack of savings are considered as 
the most crucial components leading towards emigration. 
 
As mentioned in the table above, economic, and financial reasons are both the top push 
and pull factors for Hungarian emigrants. Saphier & Simonovits (2004) investigated Hungary’s 
7 
 
Project Retour. Project Retour dealt with return migrants from 2003-2009, primarily through 
assisting the migrants in finding a job and reintegrating into the Hungarian scientific and skilled 
worker community but also by involving themselves in some social research and conference 
activities on the matter. It was the first organization who asked the migrants and some 
returners about their opinions and reasons behind leaving Hungary and coming back. This 
research was not intended to be scientific, and it was not published but instead posted on the 
website of Project Retour. Their methodology was based on a questionnaire made available on 
the website of the organization as for a couple of months in 2004 and the respondent could 
send it filled in as an attachment to an email address. They had 120 respondents, half of them 
were still living outside Hungary while the other half were returnees. Their conclusion was that 
the main factors were financial reasons and lack of career opportunities. Galgóczi (2013) states 
that wages in the UK, a top destination for educated Hungarian emigrants, are 3.3 times higher 
than those in Hungary. Additionally, wages are 2.8 times higher in Germany and Austria and 2.4 
times higher in Ireland.  
Due to the increasing wage gap between Hungary and Western European countries as 
well as what many educated Hungarians view as a worsening political situation, so migration 
intentions are changing. Szilasi & Halász (2018) notes that a 2011 study asked, “Are you 
planning to go abroad for a year or two in the next two or three years?” Around 43% of 
respondents said they had no intention of emigrating, around 37% said they had some 
intention of emigration, and around 19% said they had serious intention to emigrate.  
8 
 
The study also notes that women’s participation in is rising rapidly compared to previous 
periods. This is due to changes in the social judgment and involvement of women, their 
individual careers, labor market status, family expectation, and network expansions. 
Historically, there has been a persistent gap between worker’s social situations in 
Western and Eastern Europe. The fall of communism and move towards democracy has not 
helped or even worsened the gap in some cases. According to Bohle (2006) the unemployment 
rate in the West in the early 1990s was 9.2% while it was 10.3% in the Visegrád Group, which 
includes Hungary, and Slovenia; however, the rate in the mid-1990s to early 2000s was 7.5% in 
the West and 11.6% in Visegrád and Slovenia. Additionally, Eastern Europeans work longer 
hours for less wages on average. These workers have less bargaining power and social 
collectives. 
The consensus on reasons for emigration from Hungary is that financial and economic 
reasons are the top push and pull factors. This is especially true for educated emigrants as their 
wage potential abroad, particularly in Western and Northern Europe, is more than twice their 
wage potential in Hungary. In response to this, the Hungarian government has started 
programs both to increase return migrants and financially aid the highly educated so they will 
stay in Hungary. 
Government Response 
Valkó (2016) notes that since the end of the USSR, the government has largely had a 
policy of denying the issue of emigration publicly. Modern politicians have either denied that 
mass emigration occurs at all, contradicting data or stated that emigration is a good thing for 
Hungary. András Giró-Szász, Secretary of State for communications at the Office of the Prime 
Minister, said “first of all, there is no such thing [in Hungary] as emigration; what it is, is the 
freedom to work anywhere in the EU. [A person] takes up a job in an EU member state, but [his 
or her] family lives here at home, [he or she] transfers the money earned there, they remit 
more than two billion euros a year, and significantly contribute to the Hungarian national 
economy, and this does not cause any tension whatsoever”. He also stated, “These numbers 
are incorrect, the claim that emigration rates have increased since 2010 is false, the majority of 
9 
 
these people left before 2010 and this does not cause any problems whatsoever”. However, 
data contradicts the claim that emigration rates have not increased since 2010. Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban, who came to power in 2010, has made many statements on how emigration is 
beneficial for Hungary. He stated that: “[Emigrants] do no wrong whatsoever to their home 
country, and moreover, within one year they send home amounts worth two billion 
euros...these people should be thanked!”. He has also denied the existence of emigration at all 
when he said “It is absurd to speak of emigration from Hungary to Germany or the United 
Kingdom. These people are not emigrants, because we ourselves wanted to create one 
common economic realm in which people are free to take jobs anywhere”. However behind 
closed doors the government has worked to examine why skilled emigrants leave, prevent 
skilled emigration, and increase the return rate of skilled emigrants.  
Gyere Haza Fiatal, translated as “Come Home Young Person”, was a program run by the 
Országos Foglalkoztatási Közhasznú Non-profit KFT – OFA (National Employment Foundation) 
from April of 2015 to June of 2016. It targeted young Hungarian professionals living in the 
United Kingdom and aided in moving back home and finding a suitable job in Hungary. It was 
specifically directed towards young people living in London, because in this city, the average 
age of Hungarian professionals is the lowest, and the average education level the highest. The 
process of the program was simple for applicants. First one would register online, then they 
would be interviewed and his or her background and skills were assessed by a representative 
from the OFA, then an interview with a representative of the prospective employer involved in 
the initiative would occur, and finally the person would return home with costs of this move 
covered by the OFA. Additionally, if accepted into the programme then a person would receive 
a monthly allowance of HUF 100,000 (EUR 325) for the duration of one year, to cover 
accommodation costs (or a part thereof) or travel expenses if the distance was over 100 
kilometers or the commute took more than 5 hours back and forth. Sándor Czomba, Secretary 
of State for Employment in the Ministry of National Economic Affairs at the time stated that 
40,000 people had already signed up for the program after a few weeks. However, it quickly 
turned out that Czomba’s conclusion was wrong as the Facebook page for the website had 
been ‘liked’ by 202 people, and the total reach of the Facebook page amounted to 40,000. The 
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ministry later rectified Czomba’s statement and stated that while the Facebook page had 
reached 40,000 people, by that time 581 people had registered for information on the website. 
By end of programme over 2,000 jobs were waiting to be filled in 134 partnering companies, 
105 Hungarians had returned from the UK, and the entire budget of HUF 100 mill (EUR 300,000) 
was not spent. The initial aim of the policy was to have 50 Hungarian professionals return and 
with 105 returns this goal was surpassed. Yet it remains to be seen whether the return of 105 
professionals to the Hungarian labor market will have a significant and lasting influence on the 
overall economy. 
Röghöz kötés, meaning serfdom, name given by critics of part of the education reform in 
the fourth amendment of the Hungarian constitution. Starting in 2012, prospective students at 
a Hungarian institute of higher education who want to apply for a government-funded place are 
required to sign an agreement obligating them, within 20 years of completing their studies, to 
work in Hungary for a period that is the same duration as their studies. If they fail to do so, they 
must pay back the financial aid to the state. This was heavily criticized because it does not 
improve the education system which would encourage staying, it simply inhibits people from 
leaving. However, it is in theory a voluntary decision as to accept the financial aid. Rózsa 
Hoffman, Secretary of State for Public Education from 2013 to 2014, insisted that they “were 
not binding anyone to the land” and the agreement in question was “based on a voluntary 
decision”. However, Hallgatói Önkormányzatok Országos Konferenciája (HÖOK), the National 
Union of Hungarian Students, has argued that the measure violates people’s fundamental 
rights. Additionally, others have agreed with Diána Szekeres (2013) who raised the question as 
to whether this student agreement can really be considered a civil law agreement concluded 
since a truly voluntary decision as the state and the student are not equal entities. She also 
notes that decreasing educated emigration should be done through policy work to improve 
their economic condition and employment opportunities and that this policy could drive young 
people away sooner as they could choose to become educated abroad instead. Similar to this 
policy are the Markusovszky and Than Károly Schemes. These programs are for doctors and 
pharmacists, respectively. Participants receive a monthly stipend of HUF 100,000 (EUR 325) for 
the duration of their residency/special training on the condition that they do not accept 
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gratuity money and agree to stay in full employment in Hungary after completion of their 
residency for a period of equal length. 
While the government publicly denies the issue of brain drain, their policies state 
otherwise. Hosting return programs for young, educated emigrants and programs to aid in the 
funding of higher education on the condition that the person stay indicate the Hungarian 
government is aware of their brain drain problem. As shown by their specific programs for 
those in medical training, the brain drain problem is particularly true for their scientific 
community. What kind of problems and benefits can be caused by brain drain? 
Brain Drain Theories 
Early brain drain literature, pre-1990s, showed how brain drain is detrimental for the 
sender countries and benefits are rare and/or counteracted. This is true of Bhagwati & Hamada 
(1974). Bhagwati & Hamada (1974) state that if the government of a sender country has 
financed the education of an emigrant that it planned on recuperating in taxes, then the lack of 
recuperation results in a reduction in welfare for either or both the educated and uneducated 
labor depending on changes in national income, per capita income, and unemployment. They 
analyze three cases:  
In the first case, migration does not have an impact on expected wages or national 
income in the sender country, but per capita income is increased. If emigration increases the 
per capita income of the emigrants as well, then the brain drain is beneficial for the sender 
country. In the second case, if in the sender country wages of only the educated rise then the 
wage demand of the educated will rise as well. This will reduce the employment level of high 
skilled workers. The national income of the sender country has not changed in this case, 
however; educated workers are demanding higher wages so less are employed in order to meet 
wage demands. In the third case, since the sender country’s wages for the uneducated workers 
rose too then they will have increased wage demand and reduced employment as well. This 
increase in wage demands from the uneducated may result in a decreasing supply of educated 
workers in the sender country since workers may no longer view and education as essential. 
Therefore, the national income of the sender country will increase since the cost of education 
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to the government will decrease; however, this is counteracted by a reduction in output caused 
by decreasing skill levels and lower employment. Overall, the sender country’s national income 
will decrease most of the time in this case. 
Miyagiwa (1991) agrees with and adds to the third case of Bhagwati & Hamada (1974). It 
states that brain drain can cause a decline in the country’s national income due to changes in 
wage demands and employment levels. It adds that it may also have a highly inequitable 
income distributional effect on the population of the origin country, especially upon the 
individuals who have intermediate abilities (secondary educated). The emigration of skilled 
workers will hurt mostly the skilled workers who did not emigrate through lower employment, 
while unskilled workers would be relatively less affected. It also notes that though knowledge 
created by emigrants and possibly enhanced through agglomeration and spillover can be used 
by origin countries like Hungary, it is not free or easy to access. It is limited geographically, 
culturally, and linguistically. 
More modern brain drain theories both continue to show the detriments of brain drain, 
but also show how brain drain can improve a country’s institutions and that knowledge created 
abroad can be used in a sending country. 
Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997) argued that the possibility of a successful 
international career is an incentive for the people to study, therefore in an origin country there 
will be more highly qualified people if brain drain exists than if not and they designated this 
process with the new term “brain gain”. 
Beine et al. (2003) used data on migration rates by educational level, in order to provide 
empirical evidence for the beneficial brain drain hypothesis at an aggregate level. They found 
that migration prospects have a positive effect on human capital formation. Countries 
experiencing a beneficial brain drain are those that combine low levels of human capital with 
low skilled migration rates; however, more countries experiencing a detrimental brain drain 
rather than a beneficial one. The countries that experience beneficial brain drain are 
demographically the largest, i.e., China. 
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Faini (2003) studied the effects of skilled migration, remittances, and education. The 
author states that there is not strong evidence to conclude that raising the skill level of 
emigrants is beneficial for education in origin countries because many emigrants had decided to 
be educated abroad. So, there is no lost investment from funding the education of many 
migrants since they are not educated in the origin country, but this also means there is less 
incentive to invest in education. Additionally, skilled migrants have lower remittances so there 
is little capital transfer from them. This causes them to have little effect on the demand side of 
their origin country’s economy. 
Poutvaara (2004) also focuses on the education aspect of the brain drain. It states that 
since the possibility of migration provides incentive to invest in education in the origin country 
thus improving the education in the origin country, an increasing number of students have the 
tendency to opt for internationally applicable educations to emigrate in the future. Due to this 
individual governments in the EU are changing the provision of public education from 
internationally applicable education towards country-specific skills. However, those countries 
may end up having too many skilled workers in one field and not enough in another. For 
example, a country could end up with too many lawyers and too few doctors. 
Groizard and Llull (2006) examined GDP growth and skilled migration in 170 countries, 
and they showed in a regression that a 10% higher brain drain correlates with 0.8% lower GDP 
growth on average. Additionally, they disproved Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz’s hypothesis 
of ‘brain gain’: in the countries experiencing a higher brain drain, the ratio of tertiary educated 
people is not higher. 
Docquier and Bhargava (2007) acknowledge the fact that general emigration rates may 
hide significant occupational shortages, for example among engineers and doctors. In many 
developing countries shortages are particularly severe in the medical sector. It analyzed data on 
doctors with foreign qualifications working in the OECD countries from 1991-2004 and 
computed medical emigration rates. The results showed that even if some countries exhibited 
moderate total emigration rates, they suffered from significant medical brain drain. 
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Docquier (2012) evaluated the impact of emigration in OECD countries, including 
Hungary, in the 1990s on the employment and wage levels of the workers who did not 
emigrate. It found that emigration caused a wage decline for the uneducated worker and was a 
part of increases in inequality within all OECD countries.   
Docquier (2014), however, found that emigration helps improve the institutions in origin 
countries, like Hungary, and that emigration to more liberal democracies has mainly positive 
implications in institutional and political change in the developing countries. Emigration 
increases the origin country’s exposure to new, and generally more liberal, political ideas and 
practices through return migrants and diaspora networks. This is a part of knowledge transfer. 
While human capital is not freely available to everyone since ownership rights make it possible 
to exclude those not willing to pay for it through employment, knowledge can be used by 
anyone in the world for no cost or a very low marginal cost, aside from ideas protected by 
property rights. So, a sending country can use ideas from their own emigrants. New knowledge 
being used has increasing returns to scale for the economy. However, there are local limitations 
to the dispersion of knowledge. Knowledge and ideas are dispersed in groups, so a ‘core-
periphery’ divide occurs. This causes the highly skilled to emigrate from underdeveloped 
‘periphery’ countries and regions to the higher developed ‘core’ regions, where they gain from 
an over-proportional income increase whereas the “periphery” regions lose income potential. 
Therefore, disparity is enlarged. This means that capital stays away, and average productivity is 
low, and people are encouraged to emigrate once again. It is a vicious cycle. 
The majority of these theories utilize collected data which is then put into a table and 
analyzed. Correlations are made between data, but causation is often not proved. Some also 
use regression analysis in order to show more of a causal relationship, but this is not common. 
Most of the theories relay the negative effects of brain drain. Most focus on the 
negative effects educated emigration can have on education in the origin country, wages in the 
origin country, equality in the origin country, and lost investment in educated emigrants. 
However, some not the importance of improved networks and lower governmental costs over 
time. Are these theories true in the case of Hungary? As mentioned above, Docquier and 
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Bhargava (2007) notes that medical brain and brain drain in other scientific fields is normally 
significant for developing countries; this is true for Hungary. 
Science Brain Drain 
An ad hoc committee had been appointed by the Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (MTA), 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, to examine skilled emigration in 1990. The outcome of the 
work was published for an academic debate by Hoch, Lovász, Marx, Szelényi, Tamás, Venetianer 
and Vizi (1991) warning that Hungarian scientists’ “connection to the World Science is no longer 
manifested only in their publications, the traditional way of output, but in their free 
international movements as well”. Two successive publications, Anveiler, Tóth and Marton 
(1993) and Berényi (1993), concluded that while the migrating scientists are for the most part 
of the best quality and the brightest mind, regarding the impact factor of their publications, 
they cannot do much unless the tools and financial background of research, especially in 
natural and medical sciences, are significantly improved. Berényi (1993) suggests that if 
cooperation between Hungarian research institutes and big international centers of research is 
improved significantly, the Hungarian researchers may feel less necessary to move abroad and 
only travel from one time to another. However, this advice was not utilized, and emigration 
rose quickly, particularly due to research and development laws. 
Személyi (2011) notes that Hungary is one of the few Eastern European countries to 
have a minimum wage since the early 1990s; however, it was this that was then blamed when 
many electronic manufacturing companies left Hungary for Romania. However, these 
companies did not cite the minimum wage as why. Starting in the mid-1990s the Vice President 
of Hungary decided that they should focus on labor intensive manufacturing for the West and 
stop innovation. Companies were stripped of their research and development activities as well 
as brand names and had to be flexible for contracts. This small step back towards communism 
caused workers to have to be flexible as companies quickly came in and out of Hungary. Many 
had to take short-term work through short-term contracts or leases. Workers were fired 
whenever a production contract expires and hired again when new contracts are in sight. This is 
part of why unemployment rose a lot from the early 1990s to early 2000s. Due to increased 
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competition in the job market, wages were pushed down. The early 2000s saw a mass exodus 
of electronic companies, many of which were the country’s highest employers, from Hungary 
due to the restrictions on research and development from high skilled workers and reliance on 
low skilled workers for manufacturing. Since leaving, these companies have operated out of 
neighboring countries, mainly Slovakia, and created contracts with highly skilled Hungarian 
workers to work for them at the lower Slovakian wage rate. Many are forced to accept this due 
to the restrictions on R&D in Hungary. Poor labor conditions and wages such as this led to 
emigration. Poor wages are also an issue in the healthcare field. 
Varga (2016) states that between January 2003 and December 2011, 12% of the 
practicing medical doctors left the country, 17% left the domestic health workforce and went to 
a job outside the health sector in Hungary, and about 14% became inactive (retired, were 
placed on disability pension or child-care pension or became unemployed). Nearly all note that 
they emigrated or left the field of medicine for financial reasons. The average wage for a 
Hungarian doctor is HUF 547,000 (EUR 1,516) per month which is very low compared to other 
EU countries. To remedy this a new law was passed that will increase salaries by 2023 to HUF 
687,000 (EUR 1,905) per month. However, the average wages in top destinations for Hungarian 
doctors are still much higher than this increased salary. Germany averages 5,416-6,667 EUR per 
month, the UK averages 2,559-6,823 EUR per month, Austria averages 3,400-9,000 EUR per 
month, Sweden averages 5,025-7,150 EUR per month, and Norway averages 14,408 EUR per 
month. Additionally, health spending in Hungary is well below the EU average and continues to 
fall behind. WHO (2017) notes that in 2015, Hungary spent EUR 1,428 per capita (7.2% of GDP) 




Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 led to an increased mobility of Hungarian doctors, 
who have left in large numbers to work abroad. Between 2004 and 2007 75% of medical 
students said they intended to emigrate. This mainly affected the public sector, resulting in a 
shortage of health professionals exacerbated by the growing private sector, which is attracting 
an increasing number of doctors. Over the last 22 years, 24,828 doctors have left Hungary. This 
is the second highest amount in the EU-10. In 2019 there were 33,078 doctors actively working 
in Hungary. Since most of these doctors were under the age of 40 when they emigrated, they 
are most likely still working. Assuming they are all still working the emigration proportion is 
0.4288. Straubhaar (2000) notes that brain drain is significant when the proportion is 0.20 or 





The UK is the most popular destination for Hungarian doctors. WHO (2019) notes that 
15-20 Hungarian doctors every day inquired about work as doctors in the UK. There is a huge 
demand for doctors in the UK and in 2005, the first full year that Hungary was in the EU, 160 
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doctors emigrated to the UK, most of which were young and starting their careers despite most 
of their job descriptions requiring more experience.  
Another field experiencing major brain drain in Hungary is the field of natural sciences. 
This includes biology, chemistry, physics, and geology. Személyi (2011) found that between 
1990 and 2000, approximately 20% of emigrants had degrees in natural sciences. This means 
that in the case of natural sciences for every four degrees issued one of them would emigrate 
during this time.  
The emigration from those in a scientific field constitutes the highest emigration rate 
from Hungary. The main reason for this is wages and lack of research and development 
opportunities. Whether or not this emigration constitutes a brain drain can be further 
examined through data on educated and total emigration as well as factors that may be 
affected by high educated emigration rates. 
Brain Drain Data 
Blaskó conducted a study in 2014 called “Magyarok külföldön – Mennyien? Kik? Hol? 
(Hungarians abroad - How many? Who? Where?” with Hungarian citizens aged 20–59 years 
who has emigrated after 1989. In this age group there was a sample of 1,198 individuals, and 
out of this 618 people emigrated after 2009. In terms of education, those with no more than 
lower secondary education represented 6% of the group, while those with higher education 
represented far more. Those who attended college accounted for 20% of this group compared 
to 12% of the population in Hungary and those who attended university represented 13% of 
this group compared to 8% of the population of Hungary. Additionally, the main finding of the 
analysis from a labor market perspective is that education is a key factor associated with the 
likelihood of emigration. The higher level of education found among emigrants is not caused by 
the fact that they come from a younger and more educated population. Even after controlling 
for age and other sociodemographic characteristics, it still holds that those with vocational 
training or secondary education are two and a half times more likely to emigrate than those 
with at most lower secondary education, while graduates of colleges and universities are nearly 
five times more likely to emigrate compared to those with at most lower secondary education. 
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Education Level of Emigrants 
 
(to OECD countries, ages 25+) 
Despite a decrease in the total number of emigrants from 1990-2000, the proportion of 
those emigrants there were tertiary educated rose. There was additionally a significant increase 
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(to OECD countries, ages 25+) 
According to Strubhaar (2000) brain drain is considered to be significant if the 
proportion of tertiary education emigrants is above 0.20 therefore brain drain in Hungary has 
been significant since 1990. From 1990-2000 educated emigration rose slowly. The significant 
rises in educated emigration come when Hungary first joins the EU and then again after the 
election of Fidesz as the majority party. 2005 is the first full year that Hungary is in the EU 
having joined in May 2004. Despite there still being some restrictions on the free movement of 
Hungarians in the EU, educated migration surpassed a proportion of .4 for the first time. It is 
also the largest increase in proportion in a five-year period to date. Educated emigration still 
rises in 2010, but not nearly as large of an increase as in 2005. 2010 is when the Fidesz party 
becomes the majority party, and it still is today. Five years later in 2015, educated migration 
increases significantly again at nearly the same proportion as from 2000-2005 surpassing .50. 
Therefore in 2015 over half of Hungary’s emigrants were tertiary educated. Despite Hungary’s 
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Education Participation & Expenditure 
 
 According to KSH (2018), the total number of students pursuing tertiary education in Hungary 
has been declining rapidly. Faina (2003) notes that an increasing number of students are deciding to be 
educated outside of their country of origin to emigrate sooner and more easily. This can be beneficial to 
the government as they can decrease their education expenditures; however, there are less highly 
educated people contributing to the economy. 
 
In the case of Hungary according to the World Bank, education expenditure as a percent 
of GDP was highest in 1992 at 6.08%, this was a high period of emigration and began dropping 
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significantly in the mid-1990s when emigration slowed. It began rising again in the late 1990s 
with a peak in 2003, this was another high emigration period with the numbers of emigrants 
increasing yearly, however; it did not end in 2003 but rather 2006. Then an all-time low of 
4.16% was hit in 2012, while emigration had been rising at unprecedented levels and hitting 
new all-time highs almost yearly since 2010. Since 2014, this rate has hovered around 4.6% with 
very little change and remains at 4.6% in 2017 when the data was last available. Additionally, in 
2017 it was found that there was a 12% increase from 2016 in Hungarian students pursuing a 
tertiary education abroad. Despite increasing emigration and most emigrants being highly 
skilled, Hungary has not been increasing their education expenditure during periods of 
increasing emigration since the 1990s. This theorized benefit of brain drain in Beine et al. 
(2003) and Poutvaara (2004) is not true for Hungary and the increase in Hungarians becoming 
educated abroad could be a factor. This is the theory suggested in Faina (2003), since high 
levels of Hungarian emigrants are educated abroad then there is no lost investment in 
education, but also no incentive for Hungary to invest more in education. 
Personal Remittances 
 
In Faina (2003), he argued that high skilled migrants to do not send home any or a lot in 
remittances due to their family joining them and a weakening connection to their home country 
over time. According to Személyi (2011) Hungary’ data on remittances from high skilled 
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migrants supports this. 65% of skilled migrants have sent remittance at least once to family or a 
non-profit. The amount is usually $550-5,500 to family and under $550 to organizations. This 
usually around 3% or less of their income abroad, or 20% less than their Hungarian income if 
they had stayed. These figures are lower if one factors in those who have never sent 
remittances to Hungary. Therefore, this benefit of brain drain to Hungary is not substantial as it 
has little to no impact on the demand side of the economy. However, remittances from all 
emigrants as a percentage of GDP have been rising significantly since 2008 (the global financial 
crisis) and only recently leveling out more. So, despite the skill level of emigrants rising, 
remittances have risen as well; however, 3% of GDP is not a significant contributor to the 
demand side of the economy. 
Income Inequality 
 
The Gini Index is the degree of concentration in a country’s income distribution. A Gini 
of 0 represents 0 percent concentration in a country’s income distribution. In a country with a 
Gini coefficient of 0, everyone receives the same income. A Gini coefficient of 100 represents 
100 percent concentration in a country’s income distribution. In a country with a Gini of 100, 
one person receives all of the country’s income. Everyone else gets nothing. Neither of these 
are realistic. A Gini coefficient of 50 could mean the top 10 percent of a country’s population is 
very well-off, the next 50 percent are more or less equal, and the bottom 40 percent very poor. 
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50 could also be half have all the money and half have none, but this is not realistic. According 
to GINI Index for Hungary (2021), Hungary’s Gini coefficient has fluctuated between 27 and 35 
since 2004 but has now leveled off just below 31.  The only huge increase was from 2004-2005; 
however, 2005-2006 had the highest educated emigration up to that point and income 
inequality went down for the next few years. It again increases at end of global financial crisis, 
which was also when the Fidesz party rose to power. Despite educated emigration increases 
throughout the 2010s, the Gini coefficient has remained pretty static since 2013. This goes 
against Miyagiwa (1991) and Docquier (2012), both theories suggest that inequality increases 
within a country with high educated emigration rates; however, this is not the case for Hungary. 
Networks 
According to Személyi (2011) a 2005 study that was replicated in 2008, almost everyone 
answered yes to the question “Do you keep in touch with your Hungarian contacts?” Regardless 
of years spent abroad, most of them maintained at least 6 contacts. 50% also meet often with 
other Hungarians in their current country of residence. Additionally, one in six was maintaining 
their status as a member of a Hungarian professional institution in Hungary, but only 5% were 
members of a cultural one. When compared to such relations in their current country, we find 
that 15% are members of a professional institution in their country of residence and 50% are 
members of a cultural institution in their country of residence. It seems common in this group 
that professional relations to Hungarian institutions in the country of residence and in the 
origin country are equally/more important. At the same time, nation-related cultural needs are 
mainly considered as being fulfilled locally. Docquier (2014) notes how origin countries like 
Hungary can use the knowledge and ideas of their citizens abroad through diaspora networks. 






Hungary has the highest projected wage growth rate in all of the OECD countries. Given 
that higher wages are the number one reason for emigration from Hungary, the rising wage 
rate is a promising sign that Hungary’s brain drain is improving the wages of those who stay. As 
mentioned above, Bhagwati & Hamada (1974) states national income will increase if educated 
emigration leads to a rise in wages. This rise in wages could lead to a higher national income for 
Hungary, especially if this educated emigration is reducing the cost of education to the 
government, and it is shown above education expenditures are declining. This rise in wage rates 
is a potential benefit of educated emigration from Hungary; however less Hungarians are 
pursuing higher education due to rising wages in all sectors leading to labor market shortages. 
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Labor Market Shortages 
 
 
As shown above, in 2015 nearly 60% of Hungarian firms said they were having trouble 
filling job openings. This is the highest amount in Europe. Belyó (2015) states that there were 
339,000 jobs seekers in Hungary by the end of 2015. This is a 15.6% decrease from 2014. Only 
6% of these job seekers had tertiary education. Additionally, 47% of employers said that had 
unfilled positions due to applicants’ lack of necessary skills. This was the highest percentage 
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since 2010. A couple of fields that stood out in this study are healthcare and information and 
communications technology (ICT). There are several shortages in different fields within 
healthcare. As a response the government is working on creating more education and 
vocational training funding in infant care and pediatrics, forensic medicine, oxyology, 
traumatology, radiology, psychiatry, radiotherapy, pulmonology, infectology, pathology, 
neurology, and laboratory diagnostics. In ICT over 10,000 positions unfilled for decades. ICT 
contributes to 12% of Hungary’s GDP. This has been expanding 4.5% annually since economic 
crisis (2008), but there are not enough skilled employees. Firms in both of these fields as well as 
others agreed that most recruitment difficulties come from low wages in Hungary compared to 
the rest of the EU, so most skilled workers in Hungary look for work abroad creating labor 
market shortages. 
The overall proportion of educated emigrants to total emigrants is high and rising and is 
thought to have a relationship with all of the factors mentioned above.  
Does it Constitute a Brain Drain? 
Educated emigration from Hungary does constitute a brain drain by the technical 
definition of brain drain: “the departure of educated or professional people from one country, 
economic sector, or field for another usually for better pay or living conditions”. This is clearly 
occurring in Hungary given that all proportions of educated emigration to total emigration are 
above 0.20 and rising, but does this brain drain hurt the economy, help the economy, or 
neither? 
The main positive of educated emigration for Hungary is their strong networks and 
personal remittances. Hungary has strong network connections with their educated emigrants. 
50% of Hungarian educated emigrants keep in contact with other Hungarians in their country of 
residence and 1 in 6 is still a member of a professional organization in Hungary. This implies 
that little knowledge is lost as new ideas from these emigrants are likely to be communicated to 
other Hungarians still in Hungary. Additionally, many of these emigrants are sending personal 
remittances to Hungary. Personal remittances currently account for 3% of Hungary’s GDP, 
which is not a lot but the strong increase if sustained is promising for stimulating a fair amount 
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of the demand side of the economy for Hungary. 65% of educated emigrants have at some 
point sent personal remittances to Hungary, a high percentage and if sustained even as 
emigration rates rise then personal remittances are a promising point of educated emigration 
for Hungary. 
The main negatives of Hungary’s brain drain are found in labor market shortages, 
scientific brain drain, and lowering education levels. The high and rising labor market shortages 
have hit a critical level. Low levels of employment in major areas such as healthcare, natural 
sciences, and ICT show poor market conditions in Hungary for those educated in science fields. 
The main reason for them emigrating is financial gain. Wages are rising in Hungary though in 
both educated and uneducated fields. The GINI Index for Hungary is slowly declining showing 
that wages for all are becoming more equal. While this may appear to be a positive, less people 
are pursuing higher education. This is likely the result of rising wages in fields requiring little to 
no education. More Hungarians are not seeing a need for spending on higher education, which 
may also explain the lowering levels of education expenditure by the government. The 
Hungarian populace is becoming less educated in connection with rising wages from educated 
emigration. 
While there are benefits that Hungary is experiencing from this brain drain currently, 
they are outweighed by the negatives. Hungary’s brain drain overall hurts its economy due to 
major educated labor shortages, declining enrollment in higher education, declining education 
expenditure, and no real wage raises for educated labor compared to uneducated labor. 
Hungary’s brain drain effects and government response has not created an environment that 
improves the lives of the educated labor and makes them want to stay in Hungary. There is a 
cycle of educated emigrants leaving for financial gain, then average wages rise in all sectors, so 
less people become educated, and the ones who do become educated leave since there is no 
real increase in wages so there is good financial gain abroad. This cycle causes increasing labor 
market shortages. Unless there becomes a stronger financial incentive to stay, helping end the 
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